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Executive Summary 
 
Anyone with school age children worries about getting the best school for their child. 
However, the processes by which school choices are made, or indeed whether one gets 
an opportunity to choose, are complex. Some opt for education outside the state sector - 
if they can afford it. Others must adopt some other strategy to try to get their child into a 
decent state school. In the English school system, this generally means choosing a home 
near the school, because admission is restricted to those who live close by. The 
implications of this for house prices are well known, both through anecdote and media 
coverage. There is also an emerging body of harder evidence that these patterns of 
demand for neighbourhood schools are important. In this study we extend existing work 
to look more closely at how decisions over primary schooling are revealed in house 
price patterns. 
We consider some special features of the English school admissions system that 
add to the complexity of the decision process. For a start, catchment areas are vaguely 
defined, and it is usually a question of ‘nearest-in-first-in’. This generates uncertainty 
about which residential locations are best. The problem is compounded by the fact that 
schools have limited number of pupil places, usually capped by a limit to class sizes and 
the number of classroom spaces, but parents do not know for certain whether a school 
will be over or under-subscribed. Parents also have imperfect and confusing information 
about school quality. Faced with wide disparities in state school performance, they 
scrutinise performance ‘league tables’, study Ofsted reports, and listen attentively to 
dinner party chat, to work out where the good schools are. We ask how these issues 
affect the process of school choice and investigate their influence on house price. 
In common with other studies, we show a house price premium related to the 
performance of the nearest primary schools.  But some of our findings run counter to 
common perceptions: 
• A ten-percentage point improvement in the ‘league-table’ performance (at age 11, 
Key Stage 2) adds at least 3 per cent to the price of properties located next to the 
school. 
 
• Despite this, primary schools are, in general not desirable local amenities. Only 
the 1-in-10 top performing schools will, on average, generate significantly higher 
prices in their immediate surroundings. 
 
• The premium paid for ‘league-table’ performance is higher if local schools are 
over-capacity. There is also a premium for living close to an over-capacity, even if 
the league table performance is not outstanding. We interpret this as evidence of 
‘herd’ behaviour in school choice. An over-capacity school is a popular school, 
and so - in the eyes of eager parents - a good school. 
 
• Although a school that is over-capacity this year will likely be hard to get into in 
the next year, this does not seem to drive up the price of houses very close to good 
schools relative to those more distant.  
 
• Unsurprisingly, the influence of primary school ‘league-table’ performance falls 
quite rapidly with distance, and the effect is halved by about 600m 
 
These findings show that primary school performance is a valuable local commodity. 
This adds weight to the argument that school admissions procedures lead to ‘selection 
by income’ at primary school level. At current prices, parents can expect a move from 
an average dwelling outside a weak school, to one outside a top over-subscribed school, 
to cost around £61000 (26 per cent of the mean property price in London and the South 
East in April-June 2004). However, the results also show that the same improvement in 
less popular, under-capacity schools will cost around £12000 less.  
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 1 Introduction 
 
Anyone with school age children worries about getting the best school for their child. 
However, the processes by which school choices are made, or indeed whether one gets 
an opportunity to choose, are complex. Some opt for education outside the state sector - 
if they can afford it. Others must adopt some other strategy to try to get their child into a 
decent state school. In the English school system, this generally means choosing a home 
near the school, because admission is restricted to those who live close by.  
 
It is therefore not surprising that the issue of which schools are viewed as better features 
prominently in the dialogue of parents.  House prices and residential location decisions 
are a strong point of discussion, and in this perceptions of what constitutes a better 
school are important.  As in other group discussion environments, some talking points 
are likely to take place on the basis of limited (or maybe out-of-date) information and it 
is evident that this may shape the views of parents on schooling decisions for their 
children.  This forms the backdrop for what we study in this paper, namely the links 
between primary school performance, residential location, school capacity and house 
prices.  We set up and test various models of school choice, implementing empirical 
tests using detailed house price and school data in London and the South East of 
England. 
 
The primary school admission system is organised in England such that there is no 
deterministic relationship between location of residence and the primary school 
attended. In fact, allocation purely on the basis of place of residence became illegal in 
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 the 1990s, after some well publicised court cases. In principle, parental preference is 
what counts. In practice, good primary schools in urban areas are often full or over-
subscribed, and a number of geographically-based over-subscription criteria come into 
play. Living within some defined ‘catchment area’ can be important1; but it is often just 
a case of nearest-in/first-in. 
 
A standard approach to placing a monetary valuation on school quality is to trace out 
the effects of neighbourhood school quality on property values. But the ‘nearest-in/first-
in’ feature of the admissions system in England generally rules out empirical strategies 
that exploit well defined attendance district boundaries [as used in US work like Black 
(1999), or Bogart and Cromwell (2000)]. For primary schools, the only case where 
boundaries will be fairly non-porous is at the border between Local Education 
Authorities (LEAs).2 These are the local government bodies (150 of them in England, 
around 20 percent of which are in London) that typically manage school funding and 
admissions. We used this particular boundary feature in Gibbons and Machin (2003) 
and exploit it again here. But we also need a more general approach for the majority of 
cases when LEA boundaries are not relevant. 
 
The porous nature of school admissions geography implies that residence-school 
distance should have important impacts on the premium homebuyers pay for residences 
at locations close to good schools. This issue is one that has received little attention 
[though see Des Rosiers et al (2001) and some of the results in Kane at al (2003) for 
                                                     
1 Obtaining systematic well-defined information on catchment areas for Local Education Authorities 
(LEAs) is extremely difficult.  However, it is clear that a great deal of heterogeneity exists across the 
country.  In some LEAs well-defined catchment areas do exist, in others they change over time, and in 
others even defining a line around a catchment area proves difficult. 
2 This boundary feature is much less applicable to secondary schools, where pupils are more likely to 
cross LEA borders. 
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 exceptions], and is a central focus of this paper. We are also interested in how 
admission constraints impact on the valuation of primary school performance.  Parents’ 
willingness to pay will clearly depend on whether there are constraints, or queues, to get 
their children into their preferred school.  We thus develop further the standard hedonic 
valuation method [see Rosen (1974) for the classic exposition, or Sheppard (1999) for a 
modern survey] to provide different valuations for parents in the presence and absence 
of school admission constraints.3 In the standard approach an estimate of the implicit 
price of school productivity is available from a simple regression of property prices on 
local school performance measures where one assumes school admissions are restricted 
to local residents. In our analysis we generalize this to allow for the fact that just living 
in the local neighbourhood of a particular school may not guarantee a child’s attendance 
at that school, because some schools may be over-subscribed. Doing so permits us to 
test between different reasons as to why parents are willing to pay more for houses near 
better performing primary schools. 
 
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows.  Section 2 is devoted to model 
development where we present a framework showing how we would expect parental 
valuation to depend on school distance, and how admission constraints may impact on 
these relationships.  We look at three models, respectively based upon supply 
constraints, school popularity and congestion effects, and generate empirical predictions 
from each.  In Section 3 we describe the data and empirical methods we use.  In Section 
4 we present our estimates, and relate them back to the theoretical models presented 
earlier.  Finally, Section 5 concludes. 
                                                     
3 A parallel issue is the effects of housing supply on the rate of capitalisation of local public goods. This is 
explored in Cheshire and Sheppard (2003). We focus here on constraints on the supply of the local public 
good itself. 
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 2 Admission Constraints: Distance to School and School Capacity 
 
Distance to school and school quality 
 
The special features of the English schooling system mean that choosing a residence in 
a particular location does not guarantee admission to a school. Instead, probability of 
admission increases as distance of residential address from the school decreases. 
Transport costs also increase with distance. An obvious implication of both these factors 
is that parents’ willingness to pay for school quality through property prices at a given 
residential location must be decreasing in residence-school distance. Assume further 
that household residential choices are constrained to a general locality by labour market 
and broader housing issues, so that parents are really interested in the performance of 
neighbourhood schools relative to what can be expected in the general locality. The 
school quality q offered by a particular residential location then depends on 
neighbourhood school i’s test score performance, si, defined relative to the mean in the 
locality, ,  as . But it also depends on residence-school distance, d. For the 
moment, assume this is the distance to the nearest school.4  
_
s
_
sss i −=
We define a school quality function ( ),q s d  to represent the effective supply of 
school quality available at a residential location at distance d from a school with 
performance s. Some plausible restrictions are that ( ),0q s s= , ( ),q s 0∞ = . This just says 
that school quality at the school gate is the same as that of the school itself, but school 
quality at a large distance is just average performance ( ). If s > 0 (where ) 
_
ssi =
_
ssi >
                                                     
4 In the empirical section we work with harmonic mean distance to the nearest three primary schools. 
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 then effective quality q decreases with distance: ( ),dq s d 0< . If s < 0 the inequality is 
reversed. 
 
Admission constraints 
 
In this setting school admission constraints can act as an important feature in parental 
choice. Class size, infrastructure, resource and institutional constraints mean that 
schools cannot expand indefinitely in response to high demand. Let us define two types 
of school: admissions-unconstrained, in which pupil numbers do not generally exceed 
institutional capacity, so over-subscription criteria are irrelevant; and admission-
constrained, in which pupil numbers have reached or exceeded institutional capacity, so 
that the school’s over-subscription criteria become important. 
We propose three models, each with different predictions for the ways in which 
school constraints have some bearing on parental choice and thus on willingness to pay: 
 
1). Supply Constraints 
 
Firstly, in a supply constraint model, school capacity may have an impact on the school 
quality available at a given school-distance because it limits the supply of school quality 
over distance. This happens if there is an increased probability of exclusion at any 
distance, due to more stringent proximity-based admissions criteria. Under this scenario, 
expected quality erodes rapidly with distance from over-capacity good schools (and 
improves rapidly with distance from bad schools).5 Let us add school capacity 
                                                     
5 In principle, quality decreases with distance from under-capacity good schools only because of transport 
costs, or because there is uncertainty about availability at the time households make their choices. In any 
case, there could be some institutional bias in favour of applicants from residences neighbouring a school, 
 5
 { }0,1σ ∈ as an argument to the school quality function, with 1 indicating an admissions-
unconstrained, or under-capacity, school. Now, the absolute value of the slope of the 
distance decay function is always less for under-capacity schools: 
( ) ( ), ,1 , ,0   d dq s d q s d d< ∀ . 
 
2). School Popularity 
 
A second possible link between parental demand and school capacity arises where 
schools are likely to be admissions constrained because of earlier popularity. We term 
this the school popularity hypothesis.  In this case, full capacity can act as a signal of 
expected school quality that might not be fully revealed in school performance 
indicators based on pupil test scores. Or it can mislead parents into believing a school is 
successful, even if school performance is not particularly good. In this case, high-
performing schools that are at or over-capacity are likely to push up house prices more 
than high-performing schools that are under-capacity. School admissions constraints 
need not have an impact on the way the school performance premium changes with 
distance, but are likely to affect prices directly, or influence the sensitivity of prices to 
performance at any given school-distance. In this case, school over-capacity signals 
popularity, which interacts positively with performance in terms if perceptions of school 
quality, and willingness to pay. This implies that ( ) ( ), ,1 , ,0   s,s sq s d q s d d< ∀ . 
The supply-constraint and school popularity models are illustrated in . The upper 
Figure is the supply-constraint model, where perceived school quality declines with 
distance from better performing schools, and increases with distance from worse 
                                                                                                                                                           
even in under-capacity schools. But, in general, if school capacity acts as a supply constraint, then 
expected school quality erodes with distance more rapidly for properties close to good over-capacity 
schools than it does for those close to good under-capacity schools. 
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 performing schools.  In this model the existence of admissions constraints acts to restrict 
the supply of school quality such that perceived school quality erodes more rapidly with 
distance if the school is over-capacity than if under capacity (solid lines compared to 
dotted lines).  
The lower Figure shows the differing predictions of the popularity hypothesis.  
Here, as before, one obtains a steeper gradient between perceived quality and school test 
score performance for lower distance to school residences (solid lines compared to 
dotted lines).  But now, admissions constraints act to increase the rate at which 
perceived quality increases with test score performance, so the gradients are steeper for 
capacity-constrained schools. These Figures make it evident that there are testable 
empirical predictions that emerge from these two theoretical approaches, with different 
signed interactions between performance and distance emerging in school quality 
functions.  
 
3). Congestion 
 
In addition to supply constraints and school popularity, there is a third possible link 
between over-capacity schools and house prices. It may actually be that over-capacity 
schools suffer from problems associated with overcrowding, congestion and higher 
pupil-teacher ratios, and this may have direct effects on parental willingness to pay for 
schooling. In this case we would expect under-capacity schools to be in higher demand, 
implying higher local house prices nearer capacity unconstrained schools. In this 
congestion model, the effect of this would be to shift the curves for over-capacity 
schools in  downwards, relative to the curves for under-capacity schools, thus predicting 
the opposite from the supply constraint and school popularity models.  
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Empirical Implications 
 
Clearly, it is not possible, a priori, to use theory alone to predict quite how 
performance, school distance and school admissions constraints will influence parental 
demand, so this is question that must be addressed empirically. We assume that the 
school quality function ( , ,q s d )σ  defined above is the object of parental preference over 
schooling choices, and that this can be estimated by revealed preference methods in a 
hedonic property value framework. Property prices trace out the function ( , ,q s d )σ , once 
other factors that affect housing demand are held constant. There is, of course, a large 
literature looking at willingness to pay in a hedonic price setting, but the work looking 
at paying for schools uses a less general quality function q(s). The distinguishing feature 
of our work here is to consider the more general quality function that additionally 
incorporates d and σ. This, we believe, enables us to say a lot more about the source of 
house price premia associated with primary schooling. 
Note that our first supply-constraint hypothesis implies that the premium on home 
prices paid for school performance decays more rapidly for over-capacity schools than 
under-capacity schools. But importantly, for properties very close to schools there 
should be no difference in the performance premium between under-capacity and 
capacity-constrained schools. If this were not the case, rational home buyers would 
always choose properties close to under-capacity schools, where the marginal cost of 
performance is lower.6 In empirical terms there should be no interaction in a hedonic 
                                                     
6 This assumes that parents can choose from the full set of schools. In practice, such choices may be 
limited. Our data shows that the over-capacity schools are concentrated in the inner metropolitan areas, 
whereas under-capacity schools are more dispersed. 
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 pricing model between s and σ at zero distance and the decay should be picked up by a 
negative s*σ*d interaction. 
Conversely, if the second hypothesis, school popularity, is correct, the price of 
performance is higher in over-capacity schools than in under-capacity schools, at any 
school-residence distance. Thus there should be a negative s*σ interaction (i.e. even at 
zero distance, and actually at any distance so s*σ*d should be unimportant). Finally, the 
congestion model predicts local house prices near capacity constrained schools to be 
lower than those near schools with spare places and so there should be a negative 
association between house prices and the presence of admission constraints. 
 
 
3 Methods and Data 
 
Data sources 
 
Our data source for house prices and housing characteristics is the Nationwide Building 
Society’s survey, which is based on all property sales in Great Britain for which the 
building society makes mortgage loans. We have the data from 1995-2002. The size of 
the sample varies considerably from year to year, with the size of the market and the 
size of the lender’s share. We restrict attention to properties in the Metropolitan area of 
Greater London and its surroundings.  
Our schools data comes from the Department of Education and Skills, and is made 
up from the Annual School Census from 1996-2001 and the publicly available school 
performance tables over the same period. The lead measure of school performance in 
these tables is the proportion of children reaching target levels (Level 4) in the standard 
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 age-11 tests.7  These annual performance  table scores will be noisy measures of long 
run school performance, which we assume is parents’ main choice objective. To 
improve on these single-year measures, we assign to each school in a given year the 
average of its annual scores in the current and all prior years. 
We match each property to its nearest three primary schools (and three secondary 
schools, and nearest private school), using Euclidian distances derived from property 
and school grid references. These grid references are assigned on the basis of mailing 
address postcodes8 using Ordnance Survey CodepointTM data.9 We also include some 
area characteristics. Firstly, the Nationwide housing database provides indicators of 
neighbourhood conditions based on the Acorn classification system created by CACI 
marketing.10 In addition, we match in dwelling density estimates from the 2001 Census, 
based on address postcode. All school characteristics are matched to property 
transactions occurring in the following year, so our database of property transactions 
covers 5 years from 1997-2001, plus the first quarter of 2002. 
We use two samples: The full sample for the London and surrounding area, and a 
sub-sample restricted to properties close to Local Education Authority boundaries in 
London (for reasons which will become clear in due course when we more fully discuss 
our modelling strategy). Sample characteristics are shown in Table 1. The average 
distance between primary schools and residences in our main sample is just 560 metres. 
Average annual performance is 68 per cent over these years, meaning that 68 per cent of 
children reached the target grade between 1996 and 2000. In fact this average masks 
                                                     
7 These tests are known as the ‘Key Stage 2’ tests, as they correspond to the end of Key Stage 2 in the 
National Curriculum for primary school children. 
8 A residential postcode is, typically, shared by 10-15 houses on one side of a residential street. 
9 ‘Code Point’ provides a National Grid reference for each unit postcode in Great Britain. 
10  CACI is the UK subsidiary of CACI International Inc. and provides marketing and related information 
systems, including the customer profiling product known as ACORN. ACORN provides geodemographic 
classifications for postcodes throughout the UK. We utilise those codes that indicate postcode sectors 
(approx 3000 households) that contain high proportions of social housing.  
 10
 substantial increases over time, with the proportion now averaging nearly 80 per cent. 
There are a higher proportion of admissions constrained schools in the London LEA 
border sub-sample, but average performance and school distance is lower. 
 
Matching schools to properties 
 
Since a child at a given dwelling potentially has access to a number of schools, we need 
some way of linking schools to dwellings according to the probability of a child living 
in a particular place gaining admission. We do this on the basis of how close each 
school is to each property. For each property in our data set, we define a local school 
cluster as the set of three nearest primary schools. We define the school performance 
available to a particular dwelling i at time t as the inverse-distance weighted average of 
the performance of these nearest three schools j: 
1
1
ij j
j J
i
ij
j J
d s
s
d
−
∈
−
∈
=
∑
∑
% %
%  
(1)
where J is the set of nearest three schools to i, js%  is the school-specific performance 
measure and  is the school-property specific distance. The effective school-distance 
for a given dwelling is calculated as the harmonic mean of the nearest three schools, 
which is the natural measure given the inverse-distance weighting. So the school-
distance measure is 
ijd%
1
1 1
i
j ij
d
J d
−⎛ ⎞= ⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠∑ %  
(2)
where J = 3 in our case. Thus a property that is adjacent to one school, but further away 
from others, will be assigned the school performance of the adjacent school, and a 
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 distance of zero. A property that is equidistant from three schools is assigned the 
arithmetic-mean performance of the nearest three, and the common distance. Any 
dwellings that have a school-distance greater than 1km are dropped from our estimation 
sample, since they are unlikely to be relevant when considering school choice issues.11 
This is certainly true for primary schools, on which we focus here, although some 
children do travel long distances to attend secondary schools, which, on average, are 
much larger in terms of student numbers. 
 
School admissions constraints 
 
As our theoretical discussion has emphasised, we want to understand how 
admissions constraints influence the demand for schooling. To do this, we need some 
measure of the extent to which schools are likely to be oversubscribed or 
undersubscribed when parents make applications for admission. Applications are made 
about one year prior to entry, usually to the Local Education Authority, although some 
church schools manage their own admissions. Information on actual applications 
relative to pupil places would seem the obvious choice, though there are problems. 
Firstly, the information is not easily obtained – either by us, or by parents making their 
school choices. Secondly, a measure of over-subscription would be highly endogenous 
in the house price models we intend to estimate: school quality improvements lead to a 
simultaneous increase in demand for places and local housing. 
Instead we look for a measure of the extent to which a school is admissions-
constrained, based on pre-determined variables in our schools data set. The variable we 
use is an under-capacity index. It seems reasonable to assume that parents will expect a 
                                                     
11 This loses 17% of the total available sample. However, the results are similar, whether or not we 
restrict the sample in this way. 
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 more competitive admissions environment around over-capacity schools, with more 
prospective pupils chasing fewer places. This is first and foremost because schools 
become full through the level of applications relative to pupil places in previous years, 
which are presumably indicative of the demand parents can anticipate in the current 
year. But it is also because schools that become under-capacity through pupil losses are 
more likely to be able to admit unsuccessful applicant pupils in subsequent terms or 
years. It is not uncommon for parents to make temporary schooling arrangements until 
they can gain entry into their preferred school. 
As the basis for this index, we utilise a capacity measure that is available in our 
schools data from the UK Department of Education and Skills. In primary schools, the 
number of classroom spaces is used to determine this capacity measure. Unfortunately, 
this variable is available for only one year (2001), but it seems reasonable to treat it as 
fixed over time for the duration of our sample, since changes in school physical 
infrastructure are relatively rare. 
Over the period of spanned by our data, admissions numbers were determined at 
LEA level by a ‘standard number’ for each school which was set in the early 1990s and 
was only subject to change under special conditions like buildings improvements. 
Although we do not have information on this ‘standard number’, we know that physical 
school capacity was an important component in the way it was set and adjusted. So we 
assume that the ratio of pupils to capacity in any year is a reasonable measure of the 
extent to which schools are over-capacity, and hence likely to be admissions-
constrained in the following year. So, for each school we calculate the ratio of full time 
pupils to capacity, and use this to construct an index of the extent to which schools 
surrounding a particular residential location are free from constraints in terms of their 
ability to admit pupils. To be more precise, in our empirical work the variable σ  in the 
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 local school quality function ( ), ,q s d σ  is defined as {1-(full time equivalent 
pupils)/(school capacity)}.12 Clearly, the higher this index for a given location, the less 
likely it is that admissions to neighbouring schools are constrained by physical capacity. 
 
Empirical model 
 
Putting together the theoretical reasoning of Section 0 with the information described 
above into an empirical model of house price determination leads us to the following 
empirical specification: 
 
( )1 1ln , , ;it it i it it s itp q s d fσ γ β− − ′= + x ε+ +  (3)
 
where  is the price of property in postcode unit i at time t, q  is postcode-unit-specific 
expected school quality which is a function of: 
itp
1its − , the postcode-unit-specific measure 
of performance in the local school cluster in the previous period; , the postcode-unit-
specific school-distance defined above; and
id
1itσ − , the indicator of whether the local 
school cluster is capacity-constrained. In (3)  is a vector of other observable 
characteristics, 
itx
itε  is the usual random error term and we allow for unobserved spatial 
fixed effects, sf , related to the school cluster s. Again it is worth comparing our more 
general approach with what is typically looked at in the literature, where the q function 
incorporates only test score performance and not distance and/or capacity. 
 
                                                     
12 Where the ratio of pupils to capacity at any location is an inverse-distance weighted average of this 
ratio in the nearest three schools. 
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 Area effects on school performance 
 
 Any study of the effects of schools on house prices must take account of general 
neighbourhood factors. Anything desirable about the neighbourhood – local amenities, 
community attributes, or housing quality – will drive up local prices. In a world of 
imperfect capital markets, the rich outbid the poor for desirable neighbourhoods [e.g. 
Benabou (1996), Epple and Romano (2000)]. If children from richer backgrounds do 
better at school, then observed school quality is better in richer neighbourhoods. School 
performance and house prices are simultaneously determined, and regression estimates 
that do not take this sorting into account are biased. 
Work on school price effects has tried to get round this via a number of 
identification strategies. These include: specifying an extensive range of neighbourhood 
attributes in the property value regression [Downes and Zabel (2002)]; looking at 
differences between neighbouring properties in different school attendance districts 
[Black (1999), Gibbons and Machin (2003)], exploring what happens when school 
district boundaries are redrawn [Bogart and Cromwell (2001)]; or using semi-parametric 
methods to eliminate general spatial variation [Gibbons and Machin (2003)]. 
Here we use a combination of approaches, but our main device is to specify 
school-cluster fixed effects in our regressions. Persistent effects common to all 
properties in the school cluster can be accounted for in our property price regressions by 
a standard fixed-effects strategy, using observations in the same 3-school-cluster to 
calculate the fixed effects. In our setup, an observation is assigned to a school cluster 
with other observations that share the same nearest, second nearest and third nearest 
primary school. Observations in the same group can be property transactions from the 
same postcode in different periods, or from different postcodes in the same or other 
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 periods. 
This school-cluster fixed effect approach is illustrated in Figure 2, which maps 
three schools (indicated by ∆) in Haringey, North London and the corresponding 
residential postcode centroids in the related schools clusters. The postcode centroids are 
shaded to indicate the school cluster to which they belong. Dwellings in Cluster 1 have 
the upper right-hand school as the nearest, the lower left-hand school as the second 
nearest and the lower right-hand school as the third nearest. Cluster 2 has the lower left-
hand school as the nearest, the upper right hand school as the second nearest, and the 
lower right-hand school as the third nearest. It is left to the reader to deduce the rest. 
Each cluster is treated as a fixed effect in our regressions.  
The point of this strategy is to remove as much cross-sectional variation as 
possible13, whilst retaining the scope for measuring residence-school distance effects. 
Indeed much of the identification in our model comes from differences in the time 
trends of school-cluster performance. But not all: Some cross-sectional variation 
remains between properties within 3-school-clusters. This is because each residence has 
a unique residence-school distance vector, and so offers a unique supply of school-
quality within the cluster.14 Residence-school distance effects are identified here 
because each 3-school cluster has a different mix of properties in each year, so the mean 
residence-school distance is not constant over time. 
Our second approach for eliminating area effects is to transform (3) into a 
spatially differenced model that eliminates area fixed effects. For any characteristic ix  
associated with dwelling i, we calculate the characteristic jx  of a geographically 
                                                     
13 An alternative approach would be to use repeated observations of sales in the same postcode unit. This 
would result in a serious loss of data and information, since the sample of repeated postcodes is quite 
small, and would make it impossible for us to measure distance effects. 
14 In practice we can eliminate this variation in performance, with little effect on the performance results, 
by using simple means rather than spatially weighted means. 
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 ‘neighbouring’ dwelling j, and work with the spatially differenced variable i jx x−  in our 
regressions. This eliminates any neighbourhood effects that are common to both 
dwellings. But the transformation will also eliminate any differences in school 
performance unless we make efforts to ensure that our neighbouring dwellings have 
access to different schools. If we had clearly defined neighbourhood catchment area 
boundaries, we could focus on dwellings that are neighbouring, but in different 
catchment areas [as in Black (1999)]. Since the only ‘catchment area’ boundaries that 
can be reliably observed are the boundaries corresponding to the districts for the 
admissions authorities – the Local Education Authorities in England – we use 
differences between matched pairs of dwellings that are ‘neighbouring’, but in different 
LEAs. Each dwelling is matched to its nearest neighbour in an adjacent LEA and we 
restrict the sample to ensure that all neighbours are within some specified distance of 
each other.15  illustrates the London sample of dwellings within 1km of the nearest 
dwelling across the LEA border. Estimation is based on cross-LEA border differences 
in prices and characteristics within these thin boundary zones. 
 
 
4 Results 
 
Performance, distance, and prices 
 
Our empirical results are derived from statistical regression estimates of the house price 
model in equation (3) under alternative specifications. The main focus is on the 
estimation of the function ( , ,q s d )σ , which we parameterise as a simple linear function 
                                                     
15 We match the nearest property in the same year. 
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 of s, d, and σ with interaction terms, and we make strong efforts to deal with the 
potential endogeneity of school performance using the strategies laid out in Section 0. 
The central results relating to our hypotheses about distance and admissions 
constraints are in Table 2 and 3. We look first at distance and performance effects only 
in Table 2, where the school quality function ( ), ,q s d σ  is parameterised as a linear16 
function of distance, performance and a distance-performance interaction (at this 
juncture we assume capacity σ  has no effect). In all cases, the sample is restricted to 
properties that are within 1km of a primary school, since we regard households living 
outside this range as unconcerned with primary school performance issues.17 
The basic effect of school performance is in Row 1. This should be interpreted as 
the effect of school performance on a property at the school gate (zero distance). 
Column (a) is a property value model with a full set of property controls, area 
characteristics (as specified in the Appendix), time effects, and Local Education 
Authority dummy variables. In this specification the impact on house prices is large – 
up to 5.4 per cent for a 10 percentage point shift in school performance.18 This is close 
to the largest results we reported for English primary schools in Gibbons and Machin 
(2003) and is similar to Black’s (1999) analysis of US elementary schools. However, 
controlling for unobserved neighbourhood factors through school-cluster fixed effects in 
Column (b) almost halves the effect. Now, the main effect of performance is 3.0 per 
cent on prices for each 10 percentage-point improvement in the proportion of children 
reaching the target test grade. This is almost exactly in line with our previous results for 
the South East of England, using a different source of aggregated house price data and a 
                                                     
16 Prior experimentation suggests that non-linearities in distance or performance are not statistically 
important.  
17 It would be a different story for secondary schools where children regularly travel further distances to 
school. 
18 Calculated as [exp(0.528 × 0.1)  – 1] × 100. 
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 very different cross-sectional specification.19 We consider the fixed effect estimate of 
Column (b) to be a more robust estimate of the parameter, and the Column (a) estimate 
without school-cluster fixed effects to be upward biased by unobserved neighbourhood 
effects. 
Consider now the effect of school distance and its interaction with performance. 
Again, the estimates without school-cluster fixed effects in Column (a) are questionable. 
Firstly, the main effect of school distance is positive (Row 2) and the coefficient on the 
interaction of distance and performance is low and not statistically significant, which 
implies: i) that the performance in the nearest-school cluster has a constant effect on the 
price of neighbouring properties, regardless of their distance to the school and ii) that 
house prices decrease with distance, even from the best schools. This is hard to square 
with our theoretical discussion in Section 0, or with anecdotal evidence.  
Using the school-cluster fixed effects model in Column (b) we obtain more 
plausible results. Again, the main effect of distance from low-performing schools is 
positive: prices rise by about 1.9 per cent per 100m distance from a school with an 
implied zero performance score. However, the significant distance-performance 
interaction term in Row 3 implies that this negative school impact is ameliorated by 
school performance: for schools with 79 per cent20 and more of their pupils attaining the 
target grade. This represents the 90th percentile in the long-run performance distribution. 
Above this, the distance effect switches sign. This shows that people pay to move close 
to schools at the top of the attainment distribution. The interaction term also means that 
distance from a school reduces the school performance premium. As we would expect, 
the performance of nearest schools matters less for prices of properties that are furthest 
                                                     
19 From Table 2, Column (2) in Gibbons and Machin (2003) the estimate is 2.9% for a 10 percentage 
point improvement. 
20 The marginal effect of distance is 0.0194 – 0.0245 × s. Setting to zero and solving for s gives this 
result. 
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 away, each 100 metres reducing the house price performance premium by around 8.4 
per cent of its initial value.21 
 In the Column (c) specification, instrumenting school performance with salient 
school characteristics22 results in slightly bigger coefficients on performance, but the 
general pattern of interactions is unchanged and re-confirms the findings. Increased 
coefficient estimates using Instrumental Variable methods is what we observed in our 
earlier work [Gibbons and Machin (2003)]. Our interpretation then, and now, is that 
year-on-year or even time-averaged performance measures are less than perfect 
indicators of perceived long-run school performance and introduce a form of 
measurement error. Instrumenting with more stable school characteristics corrects for 
this attenuation bias due to measurement error.23 Note though, that the IV performance 
coefficient in Column (c) is not statistically significantly different from the estimate in 
Column (b) using the standard Hausman test (p-value = 0.232). 
The school-cluster fixed effect approach provides a strong test of the existence of 
school effects on prices. However, our assignment of dwellings to schools is based on 
proximity and we would like more certainty about the choice of schools available to 
residents of each dwelling. To do this perfectly, we would need clearly defined, 
mutually exclusive catchment areas. As discussed in earlier sections, we can use Local 
Education Authority boundaries to stand in for catchment area boundaries for dwellings 
close to the LEA borders. In practice, this means transforming the regressions to use 
differences in the variables between nearest-neighbour dwellings on either side of an 
                                                     
21 Because each 100m step reduces the premium by roughly 0.0245/0.2914 = 8.4% relative to the zero-
distance premium 
22 As instruments we use indicators of the institutional age range (with nursery, junior years only), 
church-school status, and ‘beacon’ school status, all interacted with distance. A ‘beacon’ school is a 
school designated by the Department of Education and Skills as exhibiting high teaching standards and 
models of good practice. 
23 We have further evidence for this interpretation, in that our estimates of the performance premium are 
some 50% lower if we use annual, rather than time-averaged school performance measures. 
 20
 LEA boundary. Column (d) uses these cross-border differences to identify the effects of 
access to different schools in a similar way to Black (1999), Bogart and Cromwell 
(1997, 2001), and Gibbons and Machin (2003). 
The sample in Column (d) is much smaller and less representative than the sample 
used in Columns (a)-(c) because we restrict to properties that are within 1km of the 
nearest on the other side of a LEA boundary. Consequently, we might expect some 
differences in the estimates. Nevertheless, the patterns in Column (d) are broadly similar 
to those derived from the school-cluster fixed effects in Column (b), though the distance 
effects are less severe: School performance exerts a positive impact on prices that 
significantly decreases with distance from the school; prices rise with distance from the 
school at lower performance levels, but the price-distance gradient is inverted for the 
highest performing schools. Overall, the evidence from this alternative cross-border 
approach backs up what we have found already.  
 
…with admissions constraints 
 
In Table 3 we incorporate admissions constraints into the statistical within-cluster and 
cross-border models. First, in Column (a) and (b), we include our index indicating the 
degree to which schools are under-capacity. In (c) and (d) we interact this with the 
distance and performance variables. Structured this way, the results first explore 
whether schools that are under-capacity are, on average, valued any more or less than 
those that are over-capacity. If under-capacity schools are valued because they are less 
congested (or congestion model of Section 2), we would expect under-capacity schools 
to attract higher house prices. The fully interactive models in (c) and (d) then enable us 
to distinguish more fully between the competing models of primary school choice 
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 introduced in Section 2 above. To interpret the coefficients, note that the definition of 
the capacity index means that the main effects of performance, distance and their 
interactions in Rows 1-3 relate to schools that are just at full capacity (pupils/capacity = 
1, so our index of under capacity =0). 
In the Column (a) and (b) specification the estimated coefficient on the under 
capacity variable is negative, but small and never statistically significant, showing no 
direct effect from admissions constraints on house prices.  This is consistent with our 
popularity and congestion models, which predict interactions between admissions 
constraints and performance or between admissions constraints and distance, but make 
no predictions about a direct effect from admissions constraints.  It is not consistent 
with a congestion story, where we would expect over-crowding to depress local house 
prices throughout the performance and distance distribution. 
However, to properly consider which of the theoretical models is best in line with 
the data we need to estimate the interactive model including interactions between 
capacity, school performance and distance.  These estimates are shown in Columns (c) 
and (d) where there are significant interactions between admissions constraints and the 
effects of performance and distance.24 Since the coefficients are not straightforward to 
interpret, and to link back to the theoretical discussion, we illustrate our estimates 
diagrammatically in Figures 3a and 3b. These Figures are based on all the coefficients 
in the full-sample estimates in Column (c) and the price is expressed in terms of 
proportional differences from the mid-range admissions-unconstrained school.   
Figure 3a exhibits the hedonic price function of distance, by six, school-
performance and admissions-constraint categories. The pupil/capacity ratio is set to one-
                                                     
24 Viable instruments are not available for all the performance-distance and performance-capacity 
interactions in these models. So we simply register that, in the light of our earlier IV estimates, the 
performance effects and their interactions with distance and capacity may be under-estimated. 
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 standard deviation (0.121) above unity to represent admissions-constrained, over-
capacity schools, and one standard deviation below for under-capacity schools. So the 
graphs (and following discussion) delineate schools that are 12.1 per cent over capacity 
and 12.1 per cent under capacity. The categories in Figure 3a are: 
i) Mid-performing schools (65 per cent), over-capacity (65 per cent_over) 
ii) Mid-performing schools (65 per cent), over-capacity (65 per cent_under) 
iii) High performing schools (100 per cent), over-capacity (100 per cent_over) 
iv) High performing schools (100 per cent), over-capacity (100 per cent_under) 
v) Low-performance schools (30 per cent), over-capacity (30 per cent_over) 
vi) Low-performance schools (30 per cent), over-capacity (30 per cent_under) 
The vertical ordering of the solid lines in Figure 3a shows clearly the main effect 
of school performance on prices, at any distance within the 1km limits of the sample, 
with prices of dwellings adjacent to over-capacity, top performing schools some 26 per 
cent higher than those adjacent to the worst performers25. Another clear feature from 
Figure 3a is that schools of low and mid-range performance are not regarded as positive 
neighbourhood amenities: prices actually rise as we move away from such schools (e.g. 
along the 65 per cent_over or 65 per cent_under lines). But, as we observed before in 
Table 2, the interaction between distance and performance has strong effects (Table 3, 
Row 3) resulting in the converging line pattern in Figure 3a. As a consequence, the very 
best schools (the top 10 per cent in the long-run performance distribution) pull up prices 
of dwellings within their immediate vicinity relative to those further away (e.g. along 
the 100 per cent_over or 100 per cent_under lines in Figure 3a). 
                                                     
25 Taking 70% as the performance gap, we calculate the price difference for highly admissions-
constrained schools as exp(0.70×0.300 + 0.70×0.12×0.254 ) = 0.260, where 0.70 is the performance gap 
and 0.12 is 1 standard deviation in the over-capacity index. 
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 Focussing now on the role of admissions constraints, the important thing to note is 
the weakness of the interactions between capacity and distance, or between capacity, 
distance and performance, in Rows 6 and 7 of Table 3. This means that admissions-
constraints have little of no influence of the way that the price of a dwelling changes 
with distance from neighbouring schools.  So, looking at Figure 3a we see that the 
premium associated with high-performing, over-capacity schools (100 per cent_over) 
declines slightly faster with distance than does the premium for high-performing, under-
capacity schools (100 per cent_under). But the difference is barely detectable, and, from 
Table 3, not statistically significant. 
Although admissions constraints seem to have no impact on the rate at which 
prices change with distance, they do change the implicit price of performance at any 
distance. This is seen more clearly in Figure 3b which shows the hedonic price function 
of performance, for four school types: 
i) Over-capacity, and immediately adjacent to the dwelling (0m_over) 
ii) Under-capacity, and immediately adjacent to the dwelling (0m_under) 
iii) Over-capacity at mean residence-school distance of 560m (560m_over) 
iv) Under-capacity at mean residence-school distance of 560m (560m_under) 
Firstly, observe that performance in under-capacity schools attracts a much lower 
premium than performance in over-capacity schools (from Table 3, Row 5). In fact, the 
premium for a 10 percentage-point improvement in school quality at zero distance from 
over-capacity schools is 26 per cent higher than that for under-capacity schools: 3.4 per 
cent as against 2.7 per cent.26 So, in Figure 3b, the slope of the performance-price 
function for under-capacity schools in Figure 3b is less steep (0m_under compared to 
0m_over). This has quite substantial financial implications. At current prices, parents 
                                                     
26 Calculated as exp{0.10×0.300 + 0.10×0.12×0.254 }–1=0.034 and exp{0.1× (0.300–0.10×0.12×0.254 
)}–1=0.027 from Row 1 and Row 5 in Column (c), where 0.12 is a 1 s.d. shift in the over-capacity index. 
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 can expect a move from an average dwelling outside a weak school, to one outside a top 
over-subscribed school, to cost around £61000 (26 per cent of the mean property price 
in London and the South East in Apr-Jun 2004). A similar move to an undersubscribed 
top school would cost, on average, about £49000 – some £12000 less! 
As we saw in Figure 3a, the performance premium declines as we move from 
zero-distance to mean-distance schools, but the differential between admissions-
constrained and unconstrained schools persists (560m_under compared to 560m_over). 
Again, as we observed before, households pay lower prices for properties close to 
primary schools, unless schools succeed in getting over 80 per cent of their pupils up to 
the target grades. 
Column (d) presents comparable estimates for the London LEA border sample, 
using cross-LEA border differences. We do not illustrate this specification 
diagrammatically, but it is clear from the coefficients that the patterns are similar, with 
shallower price-distance gradients, but more pronounced impacts from admissions-
constraints. The performance premium some 40 per cent greater than in admissions-
unconstrained schools (3.1 per cent for a 10 percentage point performance improvement 
in admissions-constrained schools, compared to 2.2  per cent in others27). 
 
Interpretation and discussion 
 
The reported results reveal a number of features of the house price-school performance 
relation.  First, in line with other studies [like Black (1999) and Gibbons and Machin 
(2003) for primary schools, and Leech and Campos (2003) and Rosenthal (2003) for 
                                                     
27 Calculated as exp{0.10×0.259 + 0.10×0.12×0.357 }–1 = 0.031and exp{0.10× (0.259–0.10×0.12×0.357 
)}–1 = 0.022 from Row 1 and Row 5 in Column (c), where 0.12 is a 1 s.d. shift in the over-capacity 
index. 
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 secondary schools] higher test score based school performance is associated with 
increased property prices. However, we find it is only the best one-in-ten schools that 
generate higher than average prices close-by. Second, there are important interactions 
between performance and residence-school distance and school capacity that induce 
systematic variations in the house price premium associated with better neighbourhood 
primary schools.  Third, the nature of these interactions can enable us to discriminate 
between different theoretical reasons as to why parents are prepared to pay higher prices 
for living in an area that will enable to get their children admitted to a particular school.  
So how are we to interpret the results in the light of our earlier theoretical 
discussion? The first point is that there is little evidence for a congestion model in 
which demand for over-capacity schools is low. This would imply rising local house 
prices in neighbourhoods in which schools are becoming less crowded, which is not 
what we observe. In actual fact, our under-capacity variable is generally weakly 
negatively related to house prices in the statistical models and the only place where even 
an inkling of congestion effects can be seen is from the fully interacted model at the 
very bottom of the school performance distribution.  In Figure 4 (b) one can see this for 
lower levels of performance where the over and under capacity lines cross, and over-
capacity schools attract lower prices than those that are under-capacity.  The crossover-
point on the graph in Figure 4b is at a long-run average Key Stage 2 performance level 
of 41 per cent, which is the 5th percentile of the long-run performance distribution. 
Even below this the lines are not very far apart at all, so we can almost certainly rule out 
the possibility of congestion effects in all but the worst-performing schools.  
This leaves the two hypotheses which assert that there is a higher house price 
premium for admissions-constrained schools. But these differ in the way that 
performance interacts with distance and capacity constraints.  There are two key points 
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 to note here.  First, the performance premium is higher for admissions-constrained 
schools even at zero distance to the school. Second, note also that admissions-
constraints have almost no impact on the rate at which prices change with school 
distance. Thus, in line with the discussion in Section 0, the results are supportive of our 
popularity hypothesis – there are complementarities between the signal provided by a 
schools being full and the performance of the school measured in standard pupil tests.  
On the contrary, we find no evidence that our supply-constraint hypothesis is 
correct: there is no premium to be paid for moving closer to an admissions-constrained 
school. This comparison is most easily made by looking at the Figures, which are the 
empirical analogues to the theoretical models presented in Section 2.  Comparing Figure 
3a in conjunction with Figure 1a, and Figure 3b in conjunction with Figure 1b, makes it 
evident that the evidence is in line with the predictions of the school popularity model, 
rather than the model based upon supply constraints. 
 
Is this not just unobserved school quality? 
 
Our claim then is that admissions constraints influence the process of school and 
residential choice, not by forcing parents to move much closer to full schools to increase 
the chances of admission, but by signalling popularity and encouraging demand. 
Admissions constraints have somewhat unexpected effects on the process of school 
choice. An alternative interpretation is that over-capacity, admissions-constrained 
schools are simply better quality schools in way that is observable to parents but 
unobserved to us. Under this scenario, admissions constraints do not influence school 
choice decisions. Instead, better schools – that is better in ways that are not represented 
fully by our test score performance measure – push up property prices and become over-
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 capacity through popularity. This would change the interpretation of our results only 
slightly. The interaction between performance ratings and under-capacity would, under 
this scenario, still show that popular schools that are good league-table performers 
attract higher prices than less-popular schools of a similar standard. But the popularity is 
attributable to desirable school attributes that are complementary to test-score 
performance. 
Whilst this is a plausible position, further analysis makes it seem untenable. Table 
4 presents the model of Table 3, Column (c) with additional controls for a number of 
possible performance-complementary school attributes. Column (a) includes the actual 
pupil average point-scores on the age-10/11 tests (rather than the proportion reaching 
the target level), and the point scores in age-6/7 tests. Column (b) replaces this with a 
measure of the educational ‘value-added’ that parents could expect the primary schools 
in the sample to impart to their children. This is calculated as the difference between the 
age-10/11 and age-6/7 pupil point-scores for pupils who eventually left the primary 
phase in 2002 and 2003 (the only years for which we have both tests for the same 
cohorts). Column (c) includes all the above, plus indicators of other salient school 
characteristics like age structure, designation by the Department of Education and Skills 
as a high-standard ‘beacon’ school, and the number of qualified teachers. Finally in 
column (d) we simply model the capacity variable by a dummy indicating under-
capacity. None of this makes much difference to the general pattern of results we 
observed in Table 3, and the performance-capacity interaction remains stable and 
statistically significant. If the performance-capacity interaction in the house price 
models really indicates some unobserved performance-complementary school attribute, 
then it is not a school-quality attribute that is easily recognised from amongst the list of 
usual suspects. 
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 On this basis, we conjecture that league-table school performance has more of an 
impact on house prices when schools are over-capacity, simply because the over-
capacity, admissions-constrained schools attract more attention. In principle, the 
popularity of a school provides information to prospective home buyers the quality of 
schooling they can expect, though in the case of primary phase education in the London 
area, this information does not seem to have much substantive content. 
 
 
5 Conclusions 
 
This paper presents new estimates on the value of primary schooling for London and its 
wider metropolitan surroundings, based on property value models. We develop 
methodologies that are appropriate for the English setting where admission catchment 
areas are fuzzy and porous, and which take careful account of unobserved 
neighbourhood effects. Our results are largely based on changes in performance of 
schools over time, but also on highly localised variation in school performance within 
micro-geographic neighbourhoods. Our baseline results indicate a premium of around 
3.0 per cent on prices for each 10 percentage point increase in the proportion of children 
reaching target grades in age-11 tests. This premium relates to a property notionally 
located outside the school gate. 
Our first improvement on previous work is to present plausible estimates of the 
effects of school distance on this performance premium. Each 100m distance to a school 
erodes the performance premium by about 8.4 per cent relative to its initial level, so by 
600m the premium is halved. We have also shown that all but the top 1-in-10 schools – 
judged on their long-run league-table performance – depress prices in their immediate 
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 vicinity. Average schools are not desirable local amenities. This may, in part, be 
explained by ‘flight’ from the worst schools, but environmental problems also probably 
contribute. The morning and evening ‘school-run’ brings traffic and congestion, and 
there may be additional nuisances such as playground noise that deter buyers. These 
environmental effects and their negative impacts on prices have been noted and 
estimated before [Hendon (1973)]. 
We expected admissions constraints to have important effects on parental 
decisions over schooling, and indeed there are significant interactions between measures 
of school over-capacity and the premium paid for high performing schools. Our first 
supply-constraint hypothesis was that households will pay more to live ever closer to 
high-performing, over-capacity schools than under-capacity schools because school 
places are tightly rationed. This is not borne out by our data. Nor is the notion that 
congestion effects make over-subscribed schools less attractive to parents.  A school 
that is admissions-constrained is worth more than one that is not, throughout most of the 
performance range and this impact is not sensitive to distance. 
Instead, the empirical results are consistent with our popularity hypothesis in 
which parents believe, rightly or wrongly, that popular schools are better than under-
capacity schools. This popularity effect might indicate that there are unobserved 
desirable school attributes that are complementary to league-table performance, yet we 
find it difficult to uncover any evidence of this. Thus there is a possibility of some 
degree of ‘herd’ behaviour in primary school choice, with the price not perfectly 
reflecting the fundamentals. Parents certainly do pay to get their children into better 
performing primary schools, but it is evident that they prefer popular, over-subscribed 
schools. This seems to be the case even if their league-table results may not be up-to-
scratch at the time admissions applications are made by parents. 
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 Figure 1 Conjectures about the Relationship Between Performance, Distance and 
Admissions Constraints  
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Supply constraint hypothesis: 
Admissions constraints constrain 
the supply of school quality 
Perceived school quality q 
declines with residence-school 
distance (d) for good schools (s1) 
and increases with distance from 
bad schools (s0). With 
admissions constraints ( 0σ = ) 
the rate at which perceived 
quality decreases (or increases) 
with distance is higher than 
without ( 1σ = ). The probability 
of admission decreases more 
rapidly with distance than in 
under-capacity schools. 
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Admissions constraints signal 
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Perceived school quality q 
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 Figure 2 Example of dwellings and school clusters in Haringey, North London 
 
 
 
 
 
  500m 
 
 
 
 
Triangles indicate primary school locations. Squares indicate residential postcode centroids in 
the sample. The depth of shading indicates the school cluster to which the postcode belongs. 
 Cluster 1,  Cluster 2,  Cluster 3,  Cluster 4,  Cluster 5 
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 Figure 3 Properties matched across Local Education Authority boundaries, 
London Only (1km Neighbours) 
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Figure 4: Estimated School-Price Functions 
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(a) School distance effects on property price for low, mean and top performing schools, 
by admissions constrained status 
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(b) School performance effects on property price for properties at zero and mean school 
distance, by admissions constrained status 
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 Table 1 Key Summary Statistics 
 
 Mean Standard Deviation. 
   
Full sample   
Log-property price 11.569 0.505 
Primary school performance (annual) 0.679 0.140 
Primary school performance (time average) 0.638 0.129 
Primary school distance (100m) 5.591 2.150 
Admissions un-constrained schools (proportion) 0.585 0.493 
Admissions unconstrained index 0.021 0.121 
Sample size 106717 
   
London LEA boundary sub-sample   
Log property price 11.688 0.515 
Primary school performance (annual) 0.643 0.142 
Primary school performance (time average) 0.601 0.127 
Primary school distance (100m) 5.014 2.117 
Admissions un-constrained schools (proportion) 0.431 0.496 
Admissions unconstrained index -0.018 0.119 
   
Sample size 21065 
   
 
Notes: 
Properties with prices above 1million are excluded from the Nationwide sample 
Performance is the proportion reaching level 4 in Key Stage 2 tests at age 10/11 
Full sample is for London and outer metropolitan area, restricted to properties with school-distance less than 1km 
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Table 2 Performance and Distance Interactions 
 
 OLS Within 
cluster 
IV- Within 
cluster 
X-boundary 
(1km) 
 (a) (b) (c) (d) 
     
School performance 
 
52.816 
(15.04) 
29.139 
(14.06) 
37.969 
(4.92) 
27.370 
(8.62) 
Distance (100s m) 0.493 
(1.36) 
1.943 
(10.15) 
2.759 
(4.06) 
1.216 
(4.91) 
Distance * performance  0.202 
(0.38) 
-2.449 
(-8.63) 
-3.679 
(-3.59) 
-1.772 
(-4.56) 
     
Area effects 52 LEA 14297 school 14297 school London LEA 
borders 
Sample size 106717 106717 106717 21065 
R2 0.822 0.836 0.835 0.732 
     
 
Notes: dependent variable is log property price 
Sample restricted to properties with less than 1km school distance 
Coefficients are x100 
Performance and capacity measures in year t are derived from school-specific means of years 1 to t-1 
Instruments for performance are beacon school status, church school status, age-range (nursery, junior only) and their 
interactions with school-distance 
Mean inter-property distance in (f) is 500 metres, maximum 1km 
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Table 3 Performance, Distance and Capacity Interactions 
 
 Within 
cluster 
X-boundary 
(1km) 
Within 
cluster 
X-boundary 
(1km) 
 (a) (b) (c) (d) 
     
School performance 
 
29.138 
(14.05) 
26.700 
(8.31) 
30.041 
(14.20) 
25.858 
(8.27) 
Distance (100s m) 1.943 
(10.15) 
1.216 
(4.91) 
1.885 
(9.45) 
1.175 
(4.70) 
Distance * performance -2.449 
(-8.63) 
-1.761 
(-4.53) 
-2.408 
(-8.16) 
-1.701 
(-4.36) 
Under capacity index -0.007 
(-0.01) 
-2.142 
(-1.38) 
12.006 
(1.56) 
-1.764 
(-1.02) 
School performance * under-capacity 
index 
- - -25.416 
(-2.22) 
-35.703 
(-3.13) 
Distance * under-capacity index - - -0.540 
(-0.40) 
-0.058 
(-0.21) 
Distance * performance, *under-capacity 
index 
- - 0.647 
(0.32) 
0.164 
(-0.08) 
     
Area effects 14297 school London LEA 
borders 
14297 school London LEA 
borders 
Sample size 106717 21065 106717 21065 
R2 0.836 0.732 0.836 0.732 
     
 
Notes: dependent variable is log property price 
Sample restricted to properties with less than 1km school distance 
Coefficients are x100 
Performance and capacity measures in year t are derived from school-specific means of years 1 to t-1 
Mean inter-property distance in (f) is 500 metres, maximum 1km 
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Table 4 Robustness Checks (comparable to the specification in Table 3, column 
(3)) 
 
 Model 
performance 
using test 
point scores 
and 
additionally 
include age 
6/7 test 
scores 
Additionally 
include 
future value 
added in test 
scores 
Additionally 
include all 
test scores 
and other 
school 
attributes 
Model under-
capacity as 
dummy 
variable 
 (a) (b) (c) (d) 
     
School performance 
 
27.911 
(12.34) 
30.164 
(14.25) 
27.248 
(11.79) 
32.560 
(11.71) 
Distance (100s m) 2.422 
(8.12) 
1.250 
(3.95) 
1.743 
(4.80) 
2.011 
(6.85) 
Distance * performance  -2.046 
(-6.17) 
-2.425 
(-8.22) 
-1.939 
(-5.83) 
-2.698 
(-6.21) 
Under capacity 12.129 
(1.57) 
11.502 
(1.50) 
0.101 
(1.31) 
2.485 
(1.21) 
School performance * under-capacity -24.817 
(-2.16) 
-25.126 
(-2.20) 
-24.992 
(-2.18) 
-6.222 
(-2.00) 
Distance * under-capacity 0.566 
(0.42) 
0.621 
(0.46) 
-0.681 
(-0.50) 
-0.175 
(-0.49) 
Distance * performance, *under-capacity 0.601 
(0.30) 
0.595 
(0.29) 
0.388 
(0.19) 
0.507 
(0.95) 
     
 
Notes: dependent variable is log property price 
Sample restricted to properties with less than 1km school distance 
Coefficients are x100 
League table performance and capacity measures in year t are derived from school-specific means of years 1 to t-1 
Sample size 106717 with 14297 school cluster fixed effects. 
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 Appendix 
 
List of control variables used in the house price regression models 
 
School characteristics 
Inverse distance weighted proportion of non-ethnic minority children in nearest 3 primary schools 
Inverse distance weighted proportion with statements of special educational needs in nearest 3 primary schools 
Inverse distance weighted proportion with special educational needs (not ‘statemented’) in nearest 3 primary schools 
Inverse distance weighted average number of full-time children in nearest 3 primary schools 
Inverse distance weighted average proportion with 5GCSEs Grade A-C in nearest 3 private schools 
Inverse distance weighted average proportion with 5GCSEs Grade A-C in nearest 3 state secondary schools 
Dwelling characteristics 
Number of bedrooms 
Number of bathrooms 
Floor area in metres-squared 
Building age in years 
Property type (semi-detached) Detached, Terraced, Flat/Maisonette, Other 
Central heating (full), part, none  
Garage (none), single, double, parking space  
New/second-hand building indicator  
Freehold/leasehold 
Area characteristics 
Acorn group indicators for postcode sector populations that are predominantly council estate residents: better off, 
unemployed, greatest hardship 
Distance to nearest postcode represented in the sample (decile dummies) 
Census 2001 Output Area: number of dwellings per kilometre-squared (decile dummies) 
Local Education Authority dummies (not in school-cluster fixed effect models) 
Time periods 
Year – quarter dummies 
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